DISCRIMINATION - Labor Code §132a-An injured worker who merely shows that he suffered detrimental consequences as a result of an industrial injury does not establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Instead, the injured worker must also prove that his employer singled him out for disadvantageous treatment because of the industrial nature of his injury. (See Department of Rehabilitation v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Lauher) (2003) 20 Cal.4th 1281, 5 WCAB Rptr. 10,203) [In this case, the employer established the defense of business necessity by pointing out that applicant had been off work for 26 months with no evidence that she would ever be able to return to her usual and customary job.] Lisa Wolfe v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, State Farm Insurance 10 WCAB Rptr. 10,113[Writ Denied]

DISCRIMINATION - Discrimination–Labor Code §132a–The worker established a prima facie case of violation of Labor Code §132a by proving that, because of the industrial injury, the employer engaged in conduct detrimental to the worker and not inflicted on other employees. (See Department of Rehabilitation v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Lauher) (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1281, 5 WCAB Rptr. 10,203.) [Writ Denied]

DISCRIMINATION - Labor Code §132a-A worker proves a violation of Labor Code §132a by showing that as a result of an industrial injury, the employer engaged in conduct detrimental to the worker. (See Barnes v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 524.) [Writ Denied]

DISCRIMINATION - Labor Code §132a-In order to make a prima facie case of discrimination, the injured worker must also show that he was singled out for disadvantageous treatment because of his injury. (See Department of Rehabilitation v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Lauher) (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1281, 3 WCAB Rptr. 10,251.) [Writ Denied]

DISCRIMINATION - Labor Code §132a-An injured worker's demonstration of the ability to return to work and perform the job duties without risk of further injury raises a proper inference of discriminationary action by the employer unless the employer can otherwise demonstrate to the contrary. (See Western Electric Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Smith) (1979) 99 Cal. App.3d 629.) [Writ Denied]

DISCRIMINATION - Labor Code §132a-Once the injured worker makes a prima facie showing of discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to show that its conduct was necessitated by the realities of doing business. See Barnes v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 524.) Reliance Steel Company v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (Efren Calzada) 10 WCAB Rptr. 10,078 [Writ Denied]

DISCRIMINATION - Labor Code §132a–An employer did not discriminate against an injured worker when the employer sought a medical clearance to confirm whether the injured worker could or could not perform the essential functions of his job. There was no evidence presented that the injured worker was treated differently than any other employee in the same circumstances. Robert Poole v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, United Airlines 10 WCAB Rptr. 10,032 [Writ Denied]

DISCRIMINATION - Labor Code §132a–An injured worker alleging violation of Labor Code §132a must show that he or she had a legal right to receive or retain the deprived benefit or status and that the employer had a legal duty to provide or refrain from taking away that benefit or status. (See Department of Rehabilitation v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Lauher) (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1281, 3 WCAB Rptr. 10,251.)Gregory Devore v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, Los Angeles Unified School District 10 WCAB Rptr. 10,031 [Writ Denied]

DISCRIMINATION - Labor Code §132a-The legal standard for proving actionable discrimination under Labor Code §132a is not detrimental conduct but rather whether the applicant has a legal right to receive or retain the deprived benefit or status and whether the employer had a corresponding legal duty to provide or refrain from taking away that benefit or status. (See Department of Rehabilitation/ State of California v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Lauher) (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1281, 5 WCAB Rptr. 10,203.) Hiram Haynes-Pitts v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, San Diego Unified School District 9 WCAB Rptr. 10,285 [Writ Denied]

DISCRIMINATION - Labor Code §132a–A violation of Labor Code §132a exists only when an applicant is discriminated against as a result of an industrial injury. (See Department of Rehabilitation v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Lauher) (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1281, 5 WCAB Rptr. 10,203.) [In this case, applicant was terminated as a result of a "zero tolerance" policy for stealing, and there was no finding that defendant's proffered rationale for the termination was a pretext.] Ramon Correa v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, Brink's, Incorporated 9 WCAB Rptr. 10,192 [Writ Denied]

DISCRIMINATION - Labor Code §132a–Once a prima facie case of employer discrimination had been established, the employer has the burden of producing evidence to show that the applicant was not qualified for an open position or that the position is no longer available. (See Judson Steel Corp. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Maese) (1978) 22 Cal.3d 698.) San Diego Transit Corporation v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (Lolita Mayer) 9 WCAB Rptr. 10,179 [Writ Denied]

DISCRIMINATION - Labor Code §132a–A public entity's policy of requiring industrially injured workers to use vacation time when attending medical appointments for their injuries, but allowing nonindustrially injured workers to use sick time, is discriminatory and violates Labor Code §132a. John Andersen v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, City of Santa Barbara 9 WCAB Rptr. 10,145 ___Cal.App.4th___

DISCRIMINATION-Labor Code §132a—When a violation of Labor Code §132a had been found, an award of lost wages must be reduced by such sums as the employee earned during the relevant time period. (See Wallace v. State Personnel Board (1962) 204 Cal.App.2d 759, see also Sias v. City Demonstration Agency (9th Cir. 1978) 588 F.2d 692.) Roadway Express, Inc. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (Gregory Bryant) 8 WCAB Rptr. 10,324

DISCRIMINATION-Labor Code §132a–Is a public entity's policy of requiring industrially injured workers to use vacation time when attending medical appointments for their industrial injuries, but allowing non-industrially injured workers to use sick time, discrimination in violation of Labor Code §132a? John Andersen v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, City of Santa Barbara 8 WCAB Rptr. 10,318 [Writ Granted]

DISCRIMINATION - Burden of Proof–Labor Code §132a–To meet the burden of presenting a prima facie claim of unlawful discrimination in violation of Labor Code §132a, it is insufficient that the injured worker show only that he or she suffered some adverse result as a consequence of some action or inaction by the employer that was triggered by the industrial injury. The claimant also must show that he or she had a legal right to receive or retain the deprived benefit or status, and the employer had a corresponding legal duty to provide or refrain from taking away that benefit or status. (See Department of Rehabilitation v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Lauher) (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1281, 5 WCAB Rptr. 10,203.) John Andersen v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, City of Santa Barbara 8 WCAB Rptr. 10,294 [Writ Denied]

DISCRIMINATION-Labor Code §132a–Preemption of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) is not a defense to an employee's claims for wrongful termination in violation of public policy and discrimination in retaliation for giving testimony against the employer because the LMRA cannot be read broadly to preempt non-negotiable rights conferred on individual employees under state law. (See Dechene v. Pinole Point Steel Co. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 33.) Roadway Express, Inc. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (Robert McCormick) 8 WCAB Rptr. 10,164 [writ denied]

DISCRIMINATION- ¬Labor Code §132a–The phrase "in any manner discriminates" as set forth in Labor Code §132a comprehensively includes other ways an employer may commit discrimination not covered by discharge or threatening to discharge. Acts in any manner that are discriminatory can involve issues of earnings, such as pay cuts as a result of the industrial injury. (In this case, the employer improperly asserted a provision of the collective bargaining agreement to prevent the injured worker from working overtime on weekends.)Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (Paul Dadorian) 8 WCAB Rptr.10,150 [Writ Denied]

DISCRIMINATION¬Labor Code §132a–The phrase "in any manner discriminates" as set forth in Labor Code §132a comprehensively includes other ways an employer may commit discrimination not covered by discharge or threatening to discharge. Acts in any manner that are discriminatory can involve issues of earnings, such as pay cuts as a result of the industrial injury. (In this case, the employer improperly asserted a provision of the collective bargaining agreement to prevent the injured worker from working overtime on weekends.)Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (Paul Dadorian) 8 WCAB Rptr.10,150 [Writ Denied]

DISCRIMINATION- Labor Code §132a–An employer is not guilty of violation of Labor Code §132a for terminating an employee who has sustained a compensable injury when there is no work available that the employee could perform without risk of either reinjury or further injury. (See Jordan v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 162.) [Writ Denied]

DISCRIMINATION- Labor Code §132a–An employer does not violate Labor Code §132a by refusing to make special arrangements for another job for an employee when there are no other jobs available that the employee is capable of performing, or where the employee would require extensive retraining to be able to perform any job that is available. (See Dutil v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1988) 53 Cal.Comp.Cases 134 [writ denied].) Rose Hughes v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board 8 WCAB Rptr. 10,085 [Writ Denied]

DISCRIMINATION- Labor Code §132a–Disparate treatment of industrially injured employees–An employer does not necessarily engage in "discrimination" prohibited by Labor Code §132a merely because the employer requires an employee to shoulder some of the disadvantages of his industrial injury. The legislature intended to prohibit discrimination in Labor Code §132a by prohibiting treating injured employees differently—making them suffer disadvantages not visited on other employees because the employee was injured or had a workers' compensation claim. (See Department of Rehabilitation v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Lauher) (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1281, 5 WCAB Rptr. 10,203.) Susan Carlson v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, County of San Bernardino 8 WCAB Rptr. 10,064 [Writ Denied]

DISCRIMINATION- Labor Code §123a–In this case, the collective bargaining agreement called for termination after leaves of absence of more than two years for both industrial and nonindustrial injuries, and the employer applied the leave of absence uniformly and without exception being made for industrial leaves of absence, the termination was not discriminatory and not in violation of Labor Code §132a. (See Jordan v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1985) 50 Cal.App.3d 162.) Oscar Mancilla v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, Coca-Cola Bottling Co. 8 WCAB Rptr. 10,054 [Writ Denied

DISCRIMINATION- Burden of proof–Labor Code §132a imposes a duty on the employer not to discriminate against an individual who is industrially injured. If an employer takes a negative personnel action following an industrial injury, it becomes the employer's burden to demonstrate that the negative personnel action was a result of business necessity or that it was unrelated to the work injury. (See Judson Steel Corp v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Maese) (1978) 22 Cal.3d 658.) Valley Heights, Inc v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (Xochitl R. Chavez) 8 WCAB Rptr. 10,038 [Writ Denied]

DISCRIMINATION- Labor Code §132a–An employer may permissibly take adverse action against an industrially injured employee, when the employer reasonably believes that the employee's injury prevents the employee from being able to do the job in an appropriate manner, where the employee, because of his injury, had not remained competent to perform his job, or where the employer otherwise has a reasonable and good-faith belief that the employee's injury medically precludes him from performing his job. (See Judson Steel Corp. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Mease) (1978) 22 Cal.3d 659.) This principle also applies where there is no work available that the employee could perform without risk of either reinjury or further injury (Western Electric Company v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Smith) (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 629.) or where positions are no longer available. Brenda Robbins v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, John Muir Medical Center 7 WCAB Rptr. 10,361 [Writ Denied]

DISCRIMINATION- Labor Code §132a– In determining a Labor Code section 132a claim, it is the employee's "burden to show the detriment, the action, and its cause, and the employer's burden to prove an affirmative defense of business realities." (See Smith v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 1104, see also Barns v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1898) 216 Cal.App.3d 524; Morehouse v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1984) 154 Cal.Appl3d 323.) Whether an employer's action is discriminatory is based on the employer's knowledge at the time it took the action. (See Leamon v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 1409.) Brenda Robbins v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, John Muir Medical Center 7 WCAB Rptr. 10,361 [Writ Denied]

DISCRIMINATION– Labor Code §132a– Merely showing that the employee suffered an industrial injury and suffered some detrimental consequences as a result of the injury is insufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination within the meaning of Labor Code §132a. (See Department of Rehabilitation v Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Lauher) (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1281, 5 WCAB Rptr. 10,203.) There must be evidence that the employee was singled out for disadvantageous treatment because of the industrial nature of the injury. Joan Garratt v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, Von's Companies 7 WCAB Rptr. 10,343 [Writ Denied]

DISCRIMINATION– Labor Code §132a¬b